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Abstract
We investigate homophily in the tie structure of the
global Internet by estimating Exponential Random Graph
models. Specifically, we analyze the extent to which differ-
ent variables including Gross National Income, geographic
proximity, political regime type, and press freedom rating
account for the pattern of direct country-to-country Inter-
net connections. Results show that for 2011-2014, but not
before, press freedom homophily is significantly predictive
of the presence (or absence) of country-to-country Internet
connections even when controlling for geographic proximity,
bandwidth, and whether or not a country is democratic.
The findings provide insights into changes in press freedom
around the world and the evolution of the global Internet
structure.
1. Introduction
The revival of nationalist politics in Europe and the
United States has been accompanied by differing claims
involving the role of the press in a democracy. For example,
on February 17, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump tweeted
“The FAKE NEWS media (failing @nytimes, @NBCNews,
@ABC, @CBS, @CNN) is not my enemy, it is the enemy
of the American People!” While politicians have often felt
themselves in an adversarial relationship with the press, “the
enemy of the people” phrasing struck many crossing a line
in a country whose constitution prohibits government inter-
ference with a free press. The next day, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, speaking to an audience including U.S. Vice
President Mike Pence, offered a contrasting position on
press/government relations saying, “I stand by a free and
independent press and have great respect for journalists.
We’ve always done well in Germany when we mutually
respect each other” [1].
Interestingly, these conversations about fake news and
press freedom are taking place in a communication envi-
ronment globalized by the Internet. Moreover, increasingly
available and affordable digital communication networks
enabled by the Internet allow actors other than traditional
intermediaries such as governments or mass media to play
an important role in producing and sharing news and infor-
mation. However, different levels of access to the Internet
and freedom to use the Internet as well as press freedom
influence levels of citizen participation in important and
relevant discourses in politics or other areas of citizen lives.
In particular, country-level Internet infrastructure and policy
are important factors in this. For example, North Korea’s
government policies deny Internet access to most of its
citizens. The Chinese government generally restricts access
to Google and most of its services. South Korea’s national
security law prohibits citizens access to North Korean web-
sites and limits discussions of North Korea over social
media. Internet access has become an integral component
of freedom of press and expression even as much of the
world’s population lacks the resources and/or skills to easily
access it.
In this sense, it is important to better understand struc-
tural changes of the global Internet and how these changes
are associated with changes in other aspects of society.
Against this backdrop, this paper examines several Expo-
nential Random Graph (ERG) models to understand the
extent to which social, political and economic variables
including press freedom, regime type, and economic per-
formance can account for the pattern of direct country-
to-country Internet connection.1 Our findings suggest that
in the early days (2002) of the global Internet, macro
economic performance, per capita domestic Internet users,
and homophily with regard to regime type (whether or
not a country is democratic) and geographic location are
statistically meaningful predictors of structure. However, in
the less centralized global Internet of 2014, regime type
homophily is no longer predictive though freedom of press
homophily has become significant. Our paper provides a
more nuanced understanding of interplay between structural
aspects of the global Internet and press freedom and regime
type.
1. We use the existence of a direct positive bandwidth capacity link
between two countries to indicate those two countries are connected even
if it were to be the case that no traffic flowed over that connection in a
given time period. More on this in the Method section.
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2. Background
The digital network now known as the Internet can be
thought of as beginning with Kleinrock’s 1961 paper [2]
on packet switching. By 1969, his networking ideas had
been realized in the initial ARPANET connecting machines
located in Menlo Park, California (Stanford Research Insti-
tute); University of California, Los Angeles; University of
California, Santa Barbara; and the University of Utah.
By 2002 the Internet was truly international, and 187
countries shared a high speed direct connection with at least
one other country with a total global bandwidth capacity
of 0.9 terabits per second (Tbps). By 2014 there were 201
countries connected and total global bandwidth capacity had
grown to 137.3 Tbps.
The rapid growth in the size of the global Internet is not
the whole story. The structure of the Internet has also un-
dergone considerable change from being highly centralized
around the United States to becoming increasingly decen-
tralized with increasing numbers of countries having direct
connections with more than one other country. In 2002, the
median number of direct connections across all countries
was 2 while the most direct connections any country had was
124 (U.S.). The Freeman centralization score [3] is an index
of how central the most central node in a network is relative
to all other nodes normalized by the theoretical maximum
centralization of the network. Thus scores can range between
0 (maximally decentralized) and 1 (maximally centralized).
In 2002, the score for the global Internet, using number
of direct connections as the index of a country’s centrality,
was 0.64. Moving forward to 2014, the median number
of direct connections had more than doubled to 5. Great
Britain now had the largest number of direct connections
(100). Importantly, the Freeman centrality score in 2014
had dropped to 0.45 indicating increased decentralization
with regard to the number of direct connections held by
countries connected in the global Internet.
In this paper our interest is in considering some of the
variables associated with these structural changes of the
global Internet. In doing so, we apply Exponential Random
Graph (ERG) modeling, which has gained attention in the
field of communication [4]–[6]. ERGM is used to examine
interdependent mechanisms that affect how network ties
are created, sustained, and dissolved, and to analyze the
statistical likelihood that a particular network structure will
be observed. While ERGM was initially developed in the
1990s [7], it has taken off in recent years due to excellent
expository texts along with packages for use in statistical
environments such as R [5], [8]–[11].
[6] applied ERGM to analyzing how individual and
network-level factors influence the formation of online so-
cial relationships. They found that the amount of time spent
online was positively associated with the likelihood of online
relationship formation. Another significant predictor of the
emergence of online relationship ties in their study was
network pressure toward balance, “individuals tending to
form relationships with others who have relationships in
common” [p. 180]. [4] used ERGM to examine what factors
influence structural properties of discussion networks.
Previous studies of democracy and Internet adoption
examined whether forms of political institutions influence
the government’s Internet adoption or whether the govern-
ment’s Internet adoption affects its democratic process [12]–
[17]. With empirical and theoretical studies in this area
putting forward somewhat conflicting arguments, there are
two primary schools of thoughts. The first group contends
that the type of political institution is closely associated with
the country’s adoption of the Internet and that democratic
countries are more likely to adopt the Internet [12], [14],
[15]. For example, based on data from 1991 to 2001 of
about 200 countries, [15] concluded that democracies adopt
the Internet at a much faster pace than autocracies. Similarly,
Guillen and Suarez’s study [12] showed that a country’s
democracy score was significantly associated with the num-
ber of Internet users and hosts in that country.
In comparison, the second group suggests that the Inter-
net adoption has little to do with advancements in democ-
racy arguing that the association between the Internet and
democratic development is overestimated [17]. Based on an
empirical analysis of Internet use in authoritarian regimes
from 1993 to 2010, [17] concluded that movements toward
democracy were more frequent in autocratic countries with
low Internet penetration. According to that study, autocracies
which are concerned about the domestic information envi-
ronment tend to introduce the Internet more actively than
other autocracies.
While regime type has been studied to a certain extent,
press freedom has rarely been examined in this context. Ex-
amining press freedom, not just regime type, is important as
a country’s press freedom can improve or deteriorate despite
the country maintaining the same democratic status in terms
of political institutions. For example, South Korea’s press
freedom ratings significantly plunged during Lee Myung-
bak and Park Geun-hye administrations primiarily due to
their attempts to censor online content. Our study aims to
address this gap using the press freedom index developed by
Freedom House, a U.S.-based non-governmental organiza-
tion for promoting democracy and press freedom around the
world. Freedom House publishes their Freedom of the Press
report every year evaluating the status of press freedom
in countries across the globe. The press freedom rating –
free, partly free, or not free is based on scores each country
receives in the legal, political and economic environments
in which media operate [18].
The Freedom of the Press index has been widely studied
in social science research [19]–[22]. For example, in their
study of 115 countries over the period of 2002-2010, [19]
found a positive correlation between press freedom and
economic growth. These authors analyzed foreign direct
investment (FDI) and gross domestic product (GDP) along
with the press freedom index. Karlekar and Becker con-
ducted a systematic investigation of the relationship between
democracy and press freedom with a particular focus on
the Freedom House measures. They concluded that while
there has been a strong positive correlation between press
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freedom and democracy measures, “Most often, changes in
the state of media freedom have happened in tandem with
changes in broader freedoms, therefore making it a sensitive
indicator of the overall health of a democracy” [22, p. 32].
In the case of the 2014 global Internet, as discussed in the
Method section, Spearman’s ρ between the dichotomous
regime type variable and press freedom status is .73 and
generally consistent with [22].
Sobel, Dutta and Roy [23] looked at the extent to which
press freedom in one country spills over to neighboring
countries. Using time series analysis on a sample of 102
countries over the 1994 to 2003 period, they concluded
that “a country catches approximately one-fifth of the press
freedom of its neighbors” [23, p. 141]. Neighbor here refers
to countries sharing a land border. The global Internet has
arguably enabled countries some distance from one another
to become information neighbors. If so, we might expect
press freedom homophily to be associated with direct Inter-
net ties.
3. Method
Data: Our primary analysis examines relations between
the structure of Internet connections between countries in
20142 and economic performance (Gross National Income),
number of domestic Internet users per capita, and homophily
with regard to (i) geographic location, (ii) regime type
(democratic or non-democratic) and (iii) the degree to which
the country has a free press. We combine data from several
sources. Values for country population (used in per capita
calculations), gross national income, GNI3, and Internet
Users per 100 population measures are from the World Bank
[24].4 Regime type (RegimeType) is calculated from data
provided by the Institut for Statskundskab [25]. Country
global Internet connectivity measures are from capacity data
curated by TeleGeography [26] and purchased from them.
In addition, International Internet bandwidth is considered
a useful and relevant indicator of global Internet connected-
ness, especially as previous research has shown that Internet
bandwidth and Internet traffic tend to correlate [27]. Finally,
the press freedom measure is from Freedom House [28].
[29]’s regime type measurements focus on electoral
participation and code country government types into one
of seven lexical categories: (i) non-electoral regimes, (ii)
one- and no-party regimes, (iii) non-parliamentary consti-
tutional monarchies, (iv) limited multi-party authoritarian
2. Though our focus in this paper is on 2014, reference will also be
made to our entire dataset which extends back to 2002.
3. GNI is gross domestic product plus incomes of foreign residents
minus domestic earnings of non-residents. We use the World Bank’s PPP,
purchasing power parity, GNI to facilitate cross-national comparisons.
4. We consider domestic Internet users as a proxy for how accessible
the Internet is to citizens. As a consequence, we normalize it by the
total population. Thus, for example, we would not want large population
countries where a small proportion of the population uses the Internet to
look “better” than a much smaller country with a high proportion of its
population using the Internet. GNI, on the other hand, we use as a proxy
for the economic strength of a country and thus do not normalize it by
population.
regimes, (v) exclusive democracies, (vi) male democra-
cies, and (vii) electoral democracies. During the 2002-
2014 period there were no countries coded as exclusive
or male only democracies reflecting widespread near uni-
versal suffrage. In this paper we dichotomize the regime
type variable into two categories: (1) democratic (lexi-
cal categories v-vii) and (ii) non-democratic (lexical cat-
egories i-iv). Example countries with their regime type
classification in 2014 include Iran (non-democratic), Egypt
(non-democratic), China (non-democratic), Russian Feder-
ation (non-democratic), Indonesia (democratic), Republic
of Korea (democratic), and France (democratic). Our di-
chotomized variable corresponds, over the 2002-2014 pe-
riod, to whether a country is an electoral democracy where
“leaders are selected through contested elections held peri-
odically before a broad electorate” [29, p. 1495].
As mentioned, we use the Freedom House press freedom
measure.5 In 2014, the measure included 197 countries.
The press freedom score for each country is based upon
answers from a panel of experts to 23 questions divided
into categories of legal, political, and environmental envi-
ronments. The result ultimately yields a country numeric
score ranging between 0 (highest degree of press freedom)
and 100 (lowest degree of press freedom). These numeric
scores are then assigned categorical ones where a country’s
media is classified Free (numeric score less than 31), Partly
Free (numeric score 31 to 60), or Not Free (numeric score 61
to 100). We use these categorical scores in our subsequent
analyses. There are several reasons for this. Most impor-
tantly, our interest is in the impact of homophily and thus the
numeric scores make little sense in that we would be forced
to consider two countries with scores of 10 and 95 being,
with respect to homophily, the same as if they were to have
had scores of 10 and 11. That is, in neither case would they
match since the numeric scores are not identical. Secondly,
informal discussions with a rating panel participant suggests
that numeric score changes at or near a category boundary
receive considerable additional attention from rating panels.
Thus we speculate that the categorical scores will be less
noisy than the numeric ones.
Our focus is on understanding the underlying structure of
direct Internet connections between countries and the extent
to which both country-specific social and political variables
and how countries relate with one another can account for
that structure. To investigate this question we will examine
several theoretically informed Exponential Random Graph
(ERG) models accounting for the tie structure of the global
Internet. Structure here is represented by a graph whose
nodes are countries with at least one measurable Internet
connection to at least one other country and whose edges
are the direct Internet connections between all pairs of
5. Freedom House’s press freedom measure has been criticized both for
being biased in favor of Western liberal values and for paying insufficient
attention to new media such as blogs. Excellent summaries of these
critiques are in [30] and [31].
Page 1978
countries in 2014.6 More specifically, we assume the global
Internet in a given year is comprised of a fixed set of n
countries (nodes) together with the data links connecting
them represented by the n× n adjacency matrix A where:
Ai,j =
{
1, if i, j share an Internet connection
0, otherwise
(1)
Information can flow in either direction over an Inter-
net connection and thus the graph is undirected and A is
symmetric (Ai,j = Aj,i).7 Our objective then is to estimate
a stochastic model of A which also does a reasonable job
accounting for other general properties of the observed In-
ternet such as degree distribution, shared links, and geodesic
distances.
ERG models, sometimes referred to as p-star models,
assume that any given network is a realization of an un-
derlying statistical process. In this sense, our 2014 network
is the result of sampling from a distribution of networks
each of which was generated by the same statistical model.
Using ERG techniques is a several step process. First, we
use existing data to generate a “best” approximation of that
statistical process. We then use bootstrapping to assess how
likely we are to generate simulated networks with macro
network-level properties of the sort observed in our 2014
network assuming our observed dataset is not an extreme
outlier in the actual underlying generating distribution.
What follows considers the 163-country subset for which
we have data on all measured variables used in estimating
the various models. This compares with the total of 201
countries with positive direct Internet bandwidth connec-
tions to at least one other country in 2014. Countries with no
missing data comprise 94.24 percent of the total 2014 global
bandwidth and 100 percent of all the edges (direct Internet
connections) in the full dataset. The countries excluded
from our analysis tend to be less connected (low degree)
countries. Figure 1 displays the structure but with countries
not included in our ERGM analyses shown in red along
with their country names. Figure 2 illustrates the geographic
distribution of press freedom status for the 163 in our 2014
analysis subset.
Previous work has shown that the evolution of the global
Internet exhibits considerable path dependence associated
with a country’s economic and political situation [27], [32],
[33]. These studies used country-level measures such as po-
litical regime-type, economic output, and domestic Internet
penetration to account for variations in global bandwidth
generally assuming that the attribute values for a given
country are independent of those for other countries. We
build on these past analyses by initially considering three
country-level attribute variables–total global Internet band-
width, gross national income (GNI), and domestic Internet
6. While we have 2015 data for most countries, global Internet band-
width capacity data are often revised during the year following publication.
Thus 2014 is the most recent year for which the measured values can be
assumed reliable.
7. While we have bandwidth capacity for each data link, we are not using
that information in this analysis and are treating the network as unweighted.
Aruba
Andorra
Anguilla
Argentina
Bermuda
Brunei Darussalam
Cuba
Curacao
Cayman Islands
Djibouti
Eritrea
Guadeloupe
Greenland
French Guiana
Kazakhstan
Kosovo
Monaco
Malta
Myanmar
Montserrat
Martinique
Palau
French Polynesia
Reunion Romania
Somalia
Serbia
South Sudan
Sint Maarten (Dutch part)
Syrian Arab Republic
Turks and Caicos IslandsTimor−Leste
Taiwan, Province of China
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of
Virgin Islands, British
Palestine, State of
Yemen
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the
Figure 1. Global Internet Full Structure with Dropped Nodes in Red and
Labelled: 2014
Freedom House Status
Free
Partly Free
Not Free
Figure 2. Freedom House Status (analysis country subset): 2014
users per 100 population. Given the heavy right tail of both
total bandwidth and GNI, we use the natural log of these
variables.
Our goal is to model whether any two countries share
a direct Internet connection. To accomplish this, we go
beyond node attribute values to explore the degree to which
shared characteristics or homophily adds to our ability to
predict direct Internet link between country pairs. So, for
example, are two democratic countries more likely to share
a direct global Internet connection, holding constant all other
measured variables, than are democratic and non-democratic
countries?
Direct Internet connections require capital investment
and it seems reasonable to expect that countries near to one
another may be more likely, again ceteris paribus, to share
Page 1979
a connection than would country pairs at a considerable
geographic difference. We use continent as a proxy for this
and expect continent homophily (country dyads in the same
continent) to be predictive of direct connections.8
Regime type is another homophily variable. Are coun-
tries with identical regime types (democratic or non-
democratic) more likely, ceteris paribus, to share a direct
link? The Internet was based on packet switching research
conducted in the U.S., France and Great Britain, all democ-
racies, in the 1960s. This research led to the ARPANET in
1969 and by the 1980s inter-networking connected countries
including Western European democracies, Australia, and,
in Asia, first Japan and then South Korea. By 2002, the
first year of our dataset, the global Internet connected 187
countries.
The early mover advantage in terms of connectedness
as measured by the degree, number of direct global Internet
ties with other countries for a given country, can be seen
by comparing 2002 with 2014. Of the 174 countries for
which we had regime type measures in 2002, 59.8 percent
were classified as democratic. Importantly, the democratic
countries were considerably more connected to the global
Internet than were the non-democratic ones. The mean de-
gree (number of direct connections) for democratic countries
was 7.6 (median = 3) as compared to a mean degree for
non-democratic countries of 3.2 (median = 2).9
As mentioned in the Background section, by 2014 the
entire global Internet had become more decentralized with
more countries having more direct data ties to other coun-
tries. Of the 182 countries for which we had regime type
measures in 2014, 65.9 percent were classified as demo-
cratic, roughly the same as in 2002. The mean degree
(number of direct connections) for democratic countries
was 10.4 (median = 6) as compared to a mean degree for
non-democratic countries of 8.1 (median = 5). While both
democratic and non-democratic countries were, on average,
more connected than in 2002, the differences had decreased.
Thus we might expect regime type homophily to matter
more in the earlier days of the global Internet than it would
by 2014.
The final homophily variable we consider is press free-
dom. Are countries with the same press freedom cate-
gorization more likely, ceteris paribus, to share a direct
connection? This might seem an odd expectation. Firstly,
if the critique of the Freedom House measure that it simply
reflects Western liberal values is correct, then we would
anticipate regime type and press freedom to be highly
confounded. However, it is interesting to look at Figure 3.
This shows the network structure of our 2014 network. Here
the nodes (countries) are colored as follows: blue border
8. For this purpose we use the United Nations continent definitions.
While UN region might seem a more fine grained measure, it fails to
match countries sharing a land border while classified in different regions.
An example would be the Czech Republic (Eastern European) and Austria
(Western Europe).
9. The large differences between means and medians reflects the heavy
right tail of the degree distribution. As an example, in 2002, the U.S. was
the largest degree country with degree 124.
Figure 3. Global Internet Structure 2014 after Dropping Nodes (blue border
indicates that the regime type is democratic, red border indicates the regime
type is not democratic, blue interior color indicates press freedom status
is free, red interior color indicates press freedom status is not free, and
orange interior color indicates press freedom status is partly free)
indicates that the regime type is democratic, red border
indicates the regime type is not democratic, blue interior
color indicates press freedom status is free, red interior color
indicates press freedom status is not free, and, finally, orange
interior color indicates press freedom status is partly free.
In trying to distinguish between regime type homophily and
press freedom status homophily we are interested in how
predictive border colors or interior colors are of an edge or
link between any two countries.
To summarize, we examine whether plausible models of
the tie structure of the global Internet can be estimated using
domestic Internet users per100, log(global bandwidth),
and log(GNI) as attribute covariates and
regime type, UN continent, and press freedom status
as homophily variables.
4. Results
Initially, two ERG models were estimated.10 In all mod-
els, the dependent variable was whether or not a direct
tie existed between country pairs. The main effects model
for 2014 focused only on country attribute variables. The
independent attribute variables for each country were (i)
domestic Internet users per 100, (ii) total global bandwidth
(logged), and (iii) GNI (logged). A summary of results is in
10. Models were estimated in R [34] using the SNA and ergm packages
[10], [11].
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Table 1. Since a tie (direct connection) either exists or does
not exist between any two countries, the coefficients reflect
the change in the log-odds likelihood of a direct connection
for a unit change in the predictor variable. Standard errors
are shown below the coefficients. In the main effects ERG
model, the domestic Internet users per 100 was not statis-
tically significant. However, both the GNI and bandwidth
variables were statistically meaningful predictors.
All three attribute variables are treated as continuous as
indicated by the nodecov preceding their names in Table
1. Using nodecov adds a statistic to the model equal to the
sum of the attribute value for each dyad. For bandwidth the
sum of the total global bandwidth (logged) for each pair of
countries in the network would be added to the bandwidth
statistic. This means that a large bandwidth-low bandwidth
pair would look similar to a pair in which each country
had moderate total bandwidth. It is also worth noting again
that bandwidth here refers to each country’s total global
bandwidth and not to the shared bandwidth over the pair
if there is a tie. Empirically this seems plausible in that we
do tend to observe large bandwidth (or large GNI) countries
connecting both to each other and to smaller ones. Basically,
large bandwidth (or large GNI) countries tend also to be
higher degree countries.
Table 1. 2014 MAIN EFFECTS ONLY
2014 Network
exponential family
random graph
edges −19.2000∗∗∗
(1.1500)
nodecov.UsersPer100 0.0021
(0.0017)
nodecov.ln BW 0.2540∗∗∗
(0.0307)
nodecov.ln gni 0.1970∗∗∗
(0.0307)
AIC 4,362.0000
BIC 4,392.0000
∗p < .05; ∗∗p < .01; ∗∗∗p < .001
ERG model results are generally easier to interpret
in terms of odds ratios which show any improvement a
predictor variable provides within the estimated model. A
coefficient is transformed to an odds ratio via an exponential
transformation. So if the coefficient is θˆ, the odds ratio will
be (eθˆ). 95% confidence intervals are calculated from the
coefficient’s estimated standard error (sˆe).
95%CIθˆ = e
θˆ±1.96sˆeθˆ (2)
In what follows, we will summarize each model by
providing odds ratios for the predictor variables using the
95% confidence interval. If a variable’s odds ratio is above
1.0 throughout 95% confidence interval range, we say it
significantly affects our ability to predict a direct Inter-
net connection between two countries. In the case of the
homophily variables, the odds ratio can be interpreted as
indicating the change in odds of a direct tie assuming a
match on the variable between two countries and all other
variables held constant. Table 2 shows the information in
Table 1 but now as odds ratios.
In this model, the bandwidth variable (odds ratio = 1.29
with lower 95% value = 1.21) and the GNI variable (odds
ratio = 1.22 with lower 95% value = 1.15) were significant.
The estimated odds ratio of 1.29 for bandwidth can be
interpreted as saying that there is a 1.29 increase in the
odds of a tie between two countries for every unit increase
in (logged) global bandwidth.
Table 2. 2014 ODDS 95% CI MAIN EFFECTS MODEL
term conf.low estimate conf.high
edges 0.00 0.00 0.00
nodecov.UsersPer100 1.00 1.00 1.01
nodecov.ln BW 1.21 1.29 1.37
nodecov.ln gni 1.15 1.22 1.29
The homophily model drops the Internet users per 100
country variable (since it was not a significant predictor in
the main effects model) and adds as second order effects
three homophily variables: (i) CONTINENT (to reflect that
it may be easier for a country to connect to countries on the
same continent), (ii) regime type (coded as democratic or
non-democratic), and (iii) Freedom House status (coded as
free, partly free, or not free). The three homophily variables
are discrete and tested for exact value matching (node.match
in model language) with odds results shown in Table 3. The
country-level variables remained significant. Not surpris-
ingly, of the homophily variables, CONTINENT (p < .001)
had the highest estimated odds ratio indicating that knowing
two countries are on the same continent increases the odds
of their sharing a direct connection by a factor of a little
over 4. Press freedom status homophily (p < .01) was also
significant indicating that if two countries have the same
press freedom status score, it increases the odds of a direct
connection by 28% again assuming that all other variables
are unchanged.11 Importantly, the regime type variable was
not significant.
It is clear that homophily with respect to CONTINENT
is by far the most predictive followed by freedom house
status homophily. Looked at in terms of probability, if two
countries are both on the same continent and have the same
press freedom status, the probability of their sharing a direct
connection is 0.84 all other things being equal. If we only
know that two countries have the same press freedom status
then the probability of their sharing a direct connection is
0.56. And, finally, if all we know is that the countries are
on the same continent, the probability of their sharing a
connection is 0.81. These conditional probability estimates
are obtained by doing an inverse logit transform on the
estimated coefficients, invlogit(θˆ) = 1
1+exp(−θˆ) .
Homophily means that connections form between coun-
tries who share values on the measured characteristic. A
possibly confounding effect would be transitivity wherein
countries who have connections in common will develop
11. As a point of comparison, the Las Vegas house advantage on roulette
is estimated to be 5.26%.
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direct connections with one another. To test for this we used
the (ergm) term gwesp [35] to check for geometrically
weighted edgewise shared partners by estimating a 2014
model using only gwesp and then the homophily model
adding a gwesp term. While the gwesp term was statis-
tically significant in both these models, the impact of both
the covariates and the homophily terms remained predictive,
within the 95% confidence interval, as in the base homophily
model. We used .25 as the scaling parameter in the gwesp
term. While we conclude that homophily matters, we did
not identify an “optimal” scaling factor.12
Table 3. 2014 ODDS 95% CI HOMOPHILY MODEL
term conf.low estimate conf.high
edges 0.00 0.00 0.00
nodecov.ln BW 1.22 1.27 1.32
nodecov.ln gni 1.20 1.26 1.32
nodematch.CONTINENT 3.56 4.23 5.03
nodematch.fh status 1.06 1.28 1.55
nodematch.regime type binary 0.74 0.90 1.10
Comparing AIC scores, the homophily model (4071) is
lower than that for the no homophily one (4362). Thus the
homophily model is preferred and we consider its goodness
of fit as shown in Figure 4. Here the bold line represents
the observed data against data simulated from the estimated
model. The results look fairly good for degree distribution
though it underestimates the number of edge-wise shared
partners. We also looked at goodness of fit with the gwesp
term included. Results were similar, though AIC was low-
ered to 3794, and the number of edge-wise shared partners
continued to be underestimated.
While the negative results for regime type may seem
surprising, it is important to keep in mind that our results are
with regard to the existence (or non-existence) of a direct tie
between countries. When it comes to total global bandwidth,
regime type clearly matters as shown in Table 4. The mean
global bandwidth for democratic countries is almost four
times greater than the mean for non-democracies.
To examine this further, we estimated the homophily
model for each year in the 2002-2014 period of our dataset.
The results, not shown, were that press freedom status was
predictive in 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014 but not before.
The regime type variable was predictive of direct ties in
2002, 2003, and 2004. The country attribute variables re-
mained predictive in every year for which we have data
(2002-2014) as did the CONTINENT homophily variable.
We have no plausible theoretical explanation for the recent
significance of freedom of press variable. As far as we are
aware, Freedom House made no methodological changes
in its press freedom measure post 2002.13 It is always a
12. The .25 is a typical value in the literature we have reviewed. Model
estimation takes considerably more computational time with the gwesp
term specified. We attempted to identify a “best” value for the gwesp term
using tools provided within ergm however the estimate did not converge
in over a week of run time on a 4 GHz iMac with 32GB of memory and
increased memory.size allocation for R.
13. [30, p. 9] report that Freedom House made changes in its press
freedom measure in 1989, 1994, 1997, 1999, and 2002.
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Figure 4. 2014 Homophily Model GOF
possibility that the data for any given year are anomalous in
some senses. However, the fact that results seem patterned
and consistent over the past four years argues against 2014
being an outlier. Finally, recall that ERGM is most effective
when there is no missing data and our data set includes only
those countries for which we have valid measures on all the
model variables. A consequence is that 38, mostly smaller
degree and bandwidth, countries were excluded. Countries
with missing data in 2014 and thus not included can be seen
in Figure 1.
Table 4. 2014 GLOBAL BANDWIDTH BY REGIME TYPE
regime-type mean Tbps median Tbps total Tbps n
Democratic 1.07 0.05 119.66 112
Not democratic 0.27 0.01 13.69 51
5. Discussion
Traditional news intermediaries including governments
and mainstream media outlets are no longer exclusive gate-
keepers as social media platforms including Twitter, Weibo,
and Facebook permit people to share news and information
directly with one another. That said, not everyone has easy
access to the global Internet, a necessary condition for
using social media. Country-level Internet infrastructure and
policy play an important role in this, as demonstrated in
North Korea’s government policies denying Internet access
to most of its citizens and the Chinese government generally
restricting access to Google and most of its services. At
the same time, a country’s press freedom status provides an
important snapshot of the country’s legal, political, and eco-
nomic conditions for citizens’ access to information which
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is increasingly available online. Even within countries of
a similar regime type (e.g., democratic country), levels of
press freedom can vary significantly.
Our results demonstrate that press freedom homophily is
significantly predictive of direct Internet connections even
in the context of geographic location and whether or not
a country is democratic. That is, countries exhibiting ho-
mophily with regard to press freedom are more likely to
share direct country-to-country Internet connections even
after controlling for their economic performance, political
regime type, and geographical location. Specifically, our
study showed that press freedom status emerged as an
important predictor of direct Internet ties between countries
in 2011 and remained so until 2014, the final year of
data analysis in this study. The regime type variable was
a significant predictor in 2002, 2003, and 2004.
Our research offers several important scholarly and pol-
icy implications. First, this study provides important insights
to understanding the underlying structure of direct Internet
connections between countries. By analyzing regime type
and press freedom along with other relevant variables such
as geographic location and economic development, this
study advances research on global Internet connectedness.
In addition, our results may increase understanding of the
relationship between press freedom and democracy. While
these variables are often found to be highly correlated [22],
in this paper we find (i) that the two variables play distinct
roles in predicting the existence of direct global Internet
connections and (ii) that the specific nature of these roles
has changed over the 2002-2014 period.
Second, our analysis of press freedom should be in-
formative for scholars who examine how press freedom
might spread across the globe. This study suggests that
more attention needs to be paid to associations between
press freedom homophily and direct Internet ties between
countries. Press freedom has rarely been examined in the
context of global Internet connections, and thus our study
fills a gap in the literature. Moreover, the one past study
of press freedom contagion we identified [23] concluded
that press freedom spread to nearby countries. In the age
of the global Internet, “nearness” might be extended to
countries sharing direct connections. If so, our positive
results related to the impact of both edgewise shared partners
and press freedom homophily appears consistent with a
contagion effect. Consequently, our study helps scholars
better understand the role of the Internet and press freedom
in democratic changes.
Third, the ERG approach used in this study should
be helpful for future research in related areas. Our study
contributes to advancing computational methods in commu-
nication research by demonstrating how ERG approaches
can be used to study democracy, press freedom, global
Internet connectivity, and other related variables. ERGM has
gained increased attention in the field of communication [4]–
[6] but is still new to many scholars in the field.
Moreover, findings should be helpful for policymakers
in the area of Internet connectivity and organizations that
analyze and advocate for press freedom such as Freedom
House and Reporters without Borders.
Future research should provide a more in-depth look at
relationships between the variables each year. In addition,
obtaining more complete datasets for countries is important
though it probably will not be solved anytime soon. As
mentioned before, missing data in our datasets prevented
us from analyzing all the countries. While the countries
excluded due to missing data tended to be low bandwidth
and low degree, we cannot rule out that having complete
measures on those countries would affect our results.
Finally, as with any modeling technique, ERGM can be
extremely sensitive to what might appear to be fairly minor
tweaks to the model being estimated [36]. This becomes
especially noticeable when adding variables to the model to
account for macro features such as shared edges, triangles,
or degree. These and other model parameters can be adjusted
to see if, say, AIC scores get lower. There is always the
danger of overfitting by modeling noise in the data. In this
paper we have kept the the models simple and made every
effort to develop them in a manner informed by available
literature.
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